#84: Security and the Full Monty

November 18, 2010

The general public has not responded at all well to the new “naked” scanner technology and the new “security” groping. The TSA (Transportation Security Administration), when challenged, has argued that it is only introducing these devices and policies in response to a clear and present threat of terrorism (whoops, excuse me, “man made disaster”). Forgive me if I suggest that this response is ironically and cynically disingenuous. The fact that they can’t help smirking when they say it gives the story away. Au contraire, mon TSA, I think that for you the threat of a terrorist attack is the gift that keeps on giving. In Rahm Emanuel’s now famous words, it is a crisis too good to waste.

This crisis is a convenient pretext for the introduction of an expensive new technology that is already outdated at the time it is introduced. It does not detect the new explosives being used, which means that there is really no excuse for introducing it. Why is it being introduced? Probably because someone stands to profit by it. A recently news release indicated that Michael Chertoff has a significant interest in the company manufacturing it. But more on the motivation below.

And as far as the groping is concerned, here is a counter-argument that I have not heard expressed by any of the talking heads, not even by those opposed to the grope. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, I have not heard of a single would-be attacker whose efforts were foiled by a so-called “pat down.” Where are the successes of this security procedure? The attackers who were caught, were caught through their own incompetence and stupidity, not through the vigilance of the unaccountable and otherwise unemployable gatekeepers of our safety herding us through their purely perfunctory routines.

Is there a lesson to be drawn from this? Of course there is.

If our current methods are so weak as to allow these morons through, does it make sense to simply increase them? Consider, for example, the medieval medical practice of phlebotomy or “blood letting”. It should have been pretty clear to the “leeches” of the middle ages that draining sick people of their blood didn’t cure them and sometimes even killed them. Surely, it would have been even stupider had they simply increased the amount of blood they took when their patient was not improving. Some of them did so, since people can be both stupid and dishonest. The same is true of the scanner/grope controversy. Yeah, it’s true that moderate groping hasn’t worked, so let’s now go for the full monty.

But if the system is so poor, why does our government continue to impose it on an unwilling people? As in most political situations, decisions are made for multiple converging reasons.

One is that this process is instrumental in getting the population used to the dominance of the State. In effect, this is just one more way that a Leftie government imposes its will on its citizenry. It is part of an intentional process of incremental Statist domination in which individuals are systematically desensitized and accustomed to humiliation and control. And for the Bamsters, the beauty of the current terrorist threat is that it justifies such State conditioning practices in the names of security and safety.

When challenged, the Bamster party line is simply this: Would you rather die than submit to these security precautions?

This argument presumes falsely that there is no other alternative. It is an instance of what logicians call a “complex question,” of which the common example is “Have you stopped beating your wife?” There is, in fact, an alternative. The other and demonstrably more effective security system is one in which we seek to detect terrorists rather than terrorist weapons. But here the Bamsters pull out yet another of the “reasons” they have for our inadequate system. This other alternative, they argue, would be worse than the one we have because it would use the horrible strategy of (shudder!!) racial profiling.

Of course, there are many more indicators of bad intent than race or religion, but to the Bamsters, even the slightest hint of so-called “profiling” conveniently makes any strategy unacceptable. We could be asking such questions as … Where did this sucker come from? How many planes did he take? Does he have luggage? Is he on any no-fly lists? Is he sweating like a pig? Is he shifty in his answers? And, yes, does he come from a country that has produced a lot of villains? These are all profiling questions, but the application of this system demands a workforce significantly more sophisticated than the one that is currently in force. It requires security agents capable of utilizing judgment; and anyone who has been through a check point at a major US airport will tell you that the process scarcely inspires confidence, not least because of the abysmally low level of alertness, intelligence, and skill of the personnel in charge. But the Bamster administration uses the “profiling” pretext for insisting on the current “look for the bomb” strategy rather than the “look for the bomber” strategy.

In effect, the current administration would rather lose an entire American city rather than risk offending even one possibly innocent Muslim.

But, as I said, these things are always multiply determined. Yet another reason for keeping the current system is that it is a candidate for the creation of yet another a gigantic union. And if the security folk are unionized, will this improve the quality of our security? Will it increase the accountability of the people manning the naked scanners or the ones groping the privates of blond elderly wheelchair-bound nuns? Will it give alertness to those who are asleep? Will it give intelligence to those who cannot spell it? Will it give skill to those whom no one else would hire?

Will it give judgment to those who have none?

Yes, there are many reasons for this government’s persistence with the current airport security system, but none of them have anything to do with your safety.

Rahm knows: terrorism is the gift that keeps on giving.