The second problem is that moral theories themselves are nothing more than pure politically motivated SCAM. Of all of them, the only one to have even the smallest claim to defensibility is Bentham's, when he introduces his utility theory as a way of accelerating legislation (he offers other reasons also, but they won't fly).
Consider this:
When a moral theory is tested, it is always by reference to our moral intuitions -- against what we spontaneous feel regarding specific moral cases. When the theory yields results consistent with our intuitions, we consider it confirmed, and when it doesn't, disconfirmed. But which cases do we use? We use cases in which there is uniform or near uniform strong intuition (otherwise, there's no test).
Now if there is strong uniform response on those cases, we can legitimately ask whatever do we need the theory for? Surely our intutitions are perfectly adequate to the job. The response is that we need the theory to instruct us when we move into important decision arenas where our intuitions are not strong at all! But here lies the crux of the question!
What reason do we have for accepting the authority of the theory AT ALL when our intuitions have failed?
The model being mis-applied is that of empirical science and induction. We form generalizations on the basis of observations -- fine. We use those generalization in order to predict and retrodict into regions not accessible to our observations at the time in question. Fine. But what legitimates the process is that there actually are further observations that tend to confirm the hypothesis. NOTHING LIKE THIS EXISTS IN THE PROCESS FOLLOWED BY MORAL THEORISTS.
Applying a moral theory beyond the reach of our strong intuitions has absolutely no justification at all!
This becomes really clear when we apply Moore's argument against idealism against the application of a moral theory.
A bright young vegetarian colleague of mine asked me at a dinner how I could in good conscience eat my chicken. He asked if I did not oppose pain and suffering in my loved ones. I said I did oppose it. Well, then, he said, since there is no significant difference between your loved ones and other sentient creatures, you must subscribe to the generalization that no sentient creatures should be allowed to suffer.
I said I didn't subscribe to his generalization. He asked then (triumphantly), what precisely the difference was between my loved ones and other sentient creatures?
I replied (after swallowing a mouthful of chicken) that I didn't know, but that the generalization had to be flawed since I was ok with suffering chickens, but not ok with suffering loved ones (QED). Remember, the intuitions TRUMP the generalizations.
BUT, if the intuitions must trump the generalizations (and here's the lethal point), then MORAL GENERALIZATIONS ARE USELESS. They are useless because if the case in point is intuitively clear, then we don't need them; and if the case in point is not intuitively clear, then they have no authority.
Well, they aren't actually useless, they're just useless for any legitimate purpose. They are very useful for selling favored moral doctrines to naïve captive audiences in state supported indoctrination camps, madrassahs called public schools and universituties.
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